My purpose here is not to draw the historical background of the Western Sahara conflict (as it has already been done) but to give some insights on how to prevent another war in the unstable area of Maghreb. The Western Sahara is known to be the last colony of the world that has existed in spite of the decolonization process that has not yet come to an end. Instead of granting the right to self-determination to the Sahrawis, Spain gave its share- "Spanish Sahara" to Morocco in 1975. Consequently, Morocco had to fight a strong guerrilla between 1975 and 1991 in order to keep control of this territory. However in 1991, the U.N. obtained a cease-fire that had been respected so far (with some minor violations in 1994) and since then efforts were made to organize a fair self-determination referendum. In 1997, Kofi Annan appointed James Baker as the "Special representative of the Secretary General for the Western Sahara". He obtained from the parties (Moroccan and Sahrawis) an agreement (Houston agreements) that encompassed a certain "code of conduct" governing a referendum that would decide the fate of the territory. The main bone of contention in the former concentrated on the identification of the future voters. The Moroccan government tried its best to insert into the list some Moroccan tribes in order to trick the result of the referendum. However, the MINURSO (UN mission in Western Sahara) had already established a definitive list (86500 voters) in January 2000, but also had set up an appeal procedure that could be used by 50000 Moroccan people and was referred to as the next phase. In order to analyze the current situation of the issue and propose new ideas which could act as useful components of a future resolution process, I adopted certain concepts from some conflict analysis theories and applied them where ever relevant. My purpose here is not to take only one theoretical framework an apply it to resolve an issue. On the contrary, it is to request for the assistance of some scholars on different theoretical notions in order to analyze the conflict issues that occur in reality better. "The landscape of war differed so much from case to case that I despaired to find a reliable road map" said John Stoessinger. I would say that the Sahrawi case is so complex that I despaired to apply one reliable road map. I was tempted to adopt the precept of the Frankfort School i.e. the link between ICA and reality (social, facts) in some cases are more essential than the link between ICA and theories in order to understand and deal with a conflict. It is quintessential to determine the type of conflict we face (I) in order to draw a method of resolution (II) and then make proposals to prevent another war (III).
[...] What should be done to prevent another war? most imprudent diplomatic gambit is to publicly define the situation in ‘zero-sum' terms: your gain is my loss, and vice versa. This definition is likely to generate a brink-of-war confrontation that closes off all rational opportunities for striking a compromise” ( . ) “Both sides thus become locked into a ‘game of chicken' in which neither can withdraw from the impending war without suffering great humiliation”. There is only one means possible to gain the peace in this area: the implementation of a fair referendum and a strong monitoring of the post- referendum period. [...]
[...] It satisfies the Morocco, which has the effective control of the territory (at least two third). It brings certain stability to the area, even if some companies (for instance oil companies) still hesitate to set up themselves. This situation is not too bad for the Morocco. The status quo could lead to a violent conflict only if the Sahrawis would take the arms. It is not on the Moroccan interests to take the arms for something else than response to Sahrawi attacks. [...]
[...] He says that in Bosnia, we have yet to “achieve positive peace” i.e. deal with long term, deep-rooted “conflict- as-start-up conditions”. Without doing dubious analogy, I think we face the same kind of stage with the Western Sahara conflict. The cease-fire and the Houston agreement, which led to the termination of the identification, stopped the conflict-as-process and indeed we could qualify the current peace in the area as a negative, and fragile, one. We have now to build a positive peace. [...]
[...] My purpose here is not to take one theoretical framework an apply it. On the contrary, it is to request the help of some theoretical notions from different scholars in order to better analyse the conflict issues that occur in reality. landscape of war differed so much from case to case that I despaired of finding a reliable road said John Stoessinger. I would say that the Sahrawi case is so complex that I despaired of applying one reliable road map. [...]
[...] Then, in the nineties, the Sahrawis accused the UN (Secretary Generals Perez de Cuellar and Boutros Ghali, especially) of partiality in favour of Morocco. The MINURSO, since the arrival of Kofi Annan, seems to be more neutral. But James Baker was the person who best embodied the character of a mediator. Anyway, whatever the person, the mediator is to be neutral and perceived as such by the parties. At this stage, it is important to ask the question of the parties. Who really are the parties? [...]
avec notre liseuse dédiée !
Pimido.com utilise des cookies sur son site. En poursuivant votre navigation sur Pimido.com ou en cliquant sur OK, vous en acceptez l'utilisation. Politique de Condifentialité